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This thesis documents the successful development and testing of a more 
secure industrial control system field device architecture and software. The 
implementation of a secure field device has had limitations in the past due to a 
lack of secure operating system and guidelines. With the recent verification of OK 
Labs SEL4 microkernel, a verified operating system for such devices is possible, 
creating a possibility for a secure field device following open standards using 
known security protocols and low level memory and functionary isolation. The 
virtualized prototype makes use of common hardware and an existing secure 
field device architecture to implement a new level of security where the device is 
verified to function as expected. The experimental evaluation provides 
performance data which indicates the usefulness of the architecture in the field 
and security function integration testing to guarantee secure programs can be 
implemented on the device. Results of the devices functionality are hopeful, 
showing useful performance for many applications and further development as a 
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This thesis documents the design, development, and testing of security 
software in a secure microkernel device. The device could alter the way industrial 
control system field devices are currently implemented, adding many layers of 
additional security to common devices without the need for hardware upgrades 
by using a modern architecture system and open source security software. The 
software tested will be shown to have more secure access to other devices, its 
own hardware, networking resources, and communication between its own local 
software. 
Field devices are a critical component of industrial control systems. They 
are used in many industries, especially utilities, and historically these devices 
have lacked cyber-security features. In the past, physical access to the device 
was necessary to attack it; in the last decade there have been networking 
advances that allow high speed networking to almost any location, no matter 
how remote. Advances currently available for devices, previously isolated, mean 
many of them now have remote access and are connected to the Internet. Field 
devices and subsequently industrial control systems are vulnerable to malicious 
attacks that could damage their physical systems and have serious 
environmental impacts, without additional security. 
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Added security to the networking interface of field devices is not enough. A 
separate hardware firewall could be added to deter attackers, but this raises 
additional hardware costs, another device to support, and does not 
comprehensively secure the device. It is suggested that the device must be 
secured from every logical point of attack, not just the network interface. The 
device must be secured from physical access via its own terminal or directly 
connected serial programming devices, from unwanted network access by a 
firewall or other discriminating software for both outward and inward 
communications, and the device must be secured from its own internal software 
that may have been modified for malicious intent. 
A secure device would be an unreasonable goal without guarantee of 
secure software. This starts at the most basic level of operation; the device 
kernel. A secure microkernel for which to build the other software systems is a 
requirement for the entire project. A verified correct microkernel exists for the 
use in a more secure experiment. The SEL4 microkernel has been formally 
verified and will be used for the experiment. The kernel is open source and is 
able to be modified if necessary. However, any modifications will not be verified 
and therefore should be avoided if at all possible. 
This thesis presents a review of literature and research related to this 
experiment. Chapter II details the extent of the literature review describing the 
architecture of the system based on previous work, the security features hoping 
to by implemented in the system, and the microkernel used. Chapter III 
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discusses the design architecture of the build system, a more in-depth analysis of 
the security features necessary of a secure device, and the use of memory 
isolation in the secure microkernel. Chapter IV is an overview of the experiment 
and how it was designed, showing the operation of the system and the 
implemented software. It details the use of the software and how it should be 
implemented to best secure the device. Chapter V shows the software that was 
implemented before the end of the experiment, testing, performance, barriers 
overcome through the experimentation process, and how software verification 
might be used to complete the project. The final chapter explains the outcomes 
of the experiment, presents conclusions drawn about the project and secure 
devices, and indicates future research and experimentation directions that may 






SCADA Security for Field Devices 
SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems are currently 
vulnerable to cyber-security attacks. Many SCADA systems are insecure by 
today’s Internet standards; they have chronic and pervasive vulnerabilities [1]. 
Many of the current efforts in security assessment involve searching for known 
vulnerabilities [2]. Computer controlled systems should be subjected to scrutiny 
and this is often ignored at the management level. With the upgrade of electrical 
grids (smart grids); transportation systems; and water distribution systems; now 
is the time to upgrade the security scheme as well. [1] 
Field devices are small embedded computers running their own operating 
system, discussed in a later section. The recent Stuxnet attack shows the 
importance of securing these devices [3]. SCADA devices control major 
processes in utilities and industry. An attack on these systems could be 
devastating. Hijacking of SCADA and field devices can disrupt processes and shut 
down utilities. In some systems, a simple technique known as SQL injection can 
be a successful weapon. This is inadequate protection and needs to advance as 
devices join IP networks.  
SCADA systems can have remote vulnerabilities, but can also be affected by 
inside users that are trained improperly or are malicious. Only authorized 
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personnel should have access to the interior features of the devices. This shows 
a need for IP security (firewalls), authentication, secure remote access, and 
intrusion detection without a significant cost upgrade for vendors. [1] 
OPSAID 
OPSAID (Open PCS Security Architecture for Interoperable Design) is a 
program intended to overcome security issues in the short term for SCADA 
devices. PCS (Process Control Systems) weren’t designed with adequate regard 
for security issues. Communication was typically through serial links at a single 
location segregated from the outside network. As industry has evolved, so has 
the need for remote control and diagnostics of systems. PCS devices are now 
moving to using TCP/IP as the standard communication and off the shelf 
software for their firmware. Without an added layer of security, anyone with 
knowledge of the widely used software can control the system. Typical IT 
systems incorporate secure event logging, authentication, and firewall services; 
PCS rarely uses any of these.  
The OPSAID project was designed to address security issues using 
established and available IT standards for a corporate network. Using mini-itx 
computers and the open source Linux operating system Ubuntu, the project has 
confirmed that it is possible and cost effective to build a more secure PCS field 
security appliance using open source software with thorough testing. OPSAID is 
not meant to be a standard for security, as networks and security needs will 
change in the future. An “all or nothing” standard is inappropriate. The purpose 
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is to provide a roadmap and proof of concept for vendors to address their own 
security issues and maintain interoperability with other OPSAID components. [4] 
The security features in the OPSAID implementation include: 
 Virtual Private Networking/Encryption 
 Firewall Services 
 Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
 Host Intrusion Detection Systems 
 Event Logging 
 Event Database Storage, Alert Generation & Visualization 
 End-device Configuration Session Logging 
 Authentication 
 Device Management [4] 
LEMNOS 
The Lemnos project was built upon the OPSAID projects component 
modules for interoperability. The purpose of the project is to output artifacts 
referred to as Interoperable Configuration Profiles. The asset is defined by the 
needs of the owner, both functionality and security. The Lemnos approach is 
focused on interoperability for secure modules. Much like the OPSAID project, 
Lemnos is built on open source software, but allows for “best in class” cyber 





A kernel is the lowest level of software abstraction on hardware. Its duties 
include managing system resources and connecting applications to actual data 
processing on the hardware level. In a monolithic kernel device drivers, file 
systems, and many other features are a part of the operating system kernel. 
These services require privileged access to system resources, usually access to 
physical memory , and only kernel code can accesses these resources. 
In microkernels, most of the features, such as device drivers, file IO, etc. 
are implemented outside of the privileged mode of the processor. This allows for 
improved security since these software services are limited to only specific 
resources. The drawback of this approach is performance. A microkernel will 
implement the smallest set of operations and abstractions in the kernel and the 
drivers, file systems, and other functions in user-space. [6] 
Microkernel History 
In monolithic kernel design, programs in the kernel can access any 
resources the kernel has access to, all of the physical memory. They are 
“trusted” not to violate their memory boundaries. This structure grew beyond 
usability as operating systems grew to enormous proportions. To help calm this 
growing beast in kernel space, layered operating systems were developed. 
Modular programming techniques helped to handle the scale of software 
development. Functions in layered operating systems are organized in a structure 
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to allow communication and interaction between adjacent layers only. Still, most 
layers were implemented and executed in kernel mode. 
The layered approach, shown in Figure 2.1, helped simplify programming 
and the size of the kernel, but each layer possessed a great deal of functionality. 
A change in one layer could cause undesirable effects in adjacent layers, difficult 
to trace bugs, and numerous other problems. The interaction between these 
layers made it exceptionally difficult to build in security due to every layer being 
able to access all functions of the adjacent layers. A bug in one layer could allow 
malicious code to gain control of the hardware or disrupt operation of the device 
entirely. 
 
Figure 2.1: Layered kernel architecture [7] 
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The microkernel was created under the philosophy that only the essential 
functions of the operating system were implemented in the actual kernel. Less 
essential functions and applications are built on top of the microkernel. These 
functions operate in user mode as opposed to the more secure kernel mode. 
There is no concrete rule as to what is essential and should be compiled into the 
kernel, but the common definition is for most services that were previously part 
of the operating system are now external to the kernel as a separate module or 
subsystem that interacts with the kernel and with each other; these services can 
include security services, windowing systems, virtual memory managers, file 
systems, and device drivers. [7] 
Microkernel Design 
The design of a microkernel is implemented to solve some of the problems 
mentioned in monolithic kernels and layered operating systems mentioned 
above. A microkernel architecture is a horizontal implementation of the 
abstraction system, as opposed to the vertical model of a layered architecture. 
All operating system components external to the microkernel are implemented as 
server processes that interact with one another on a peer basis in user mode, 
shown in Figure 2.2. To communicate, typically they will send messaged through 
the microkernel via IPC calls. This allows bugs and unintended actions to be 
more easily traced since layers are not talking to each other, but instead can only 
interact by way of loggable messages through the microkernel. This allows for a 




Figure 2.2: Microkernel architecture [7] 
The microkernel is required to act as the message exchange between the 
user mode components. The microkernel will validate the messages, relay them 
to the user mode recipients, and grants access to hardware. The microkernel 
adds extra security by performing message transfers through a protection 
function; it prevents messages from being passed unless exchange between the 
components is allowed. This prevents hijacking of drivers or other system 
resources by unauthorized components. This is a client/server architecture within 
a single computer, where each component can be thought of a peer client on a 
network and they can only transmit messages, which can be filtered, through the 
server. These messages can be sent to other components and request the 
primitive functions compiled into the microkernel. 
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Microkernel design creates a uniform interface for processes to make 
requests. A component does not need to make a distinction between kernel-level 
and user-level services as all requests will be processed by the kernel. This 
allows for easy extensibility; newer components or modules can be installed on 
the microkernel to allow for the use of newer hardware, alternative file systems, 
and new software techniques come to light. Allowing a modest microkernel to be 
programmed once and used even after computer upgrades or software 
technologies change. The upgraded services do not require all the services to be 
updated. 
A Microkernel architecture is more efficient by design. Components can be 
easily removed for a smaller footprint or replaced for a system lacking powerful 
hardware. The memory manager can be easily replaced to deal with small 
amounts of RAM and a lack of swap space if the hardware requires it. [7] 
Microkernels for Secure Field Devices 
Field devices connect sensors, actuators, and other input/output peripherals 
to a control network. This provides remote measuring and control capabilities. 
These devices must be secured to avoid unauthorized control of utilities and 
other applications. The security of these devices directly reflects to the safety of 
the operators and everyone involved with the use of the utility. Unauthorized 




To secure field devices, the microkernel controlling the hardware has to be 
secure. No device is impenetrable, but care can be taken to make it as difficult as 
possible. This was less necessary when devices were on isolated networks; many 
devices are now accessible via the Internet and therefore must the security 
scheme must change. Modern secure microkernels employ isolated partitions,  
each with its own isolated memory and contact to other hardware, software, or 
instrumentation; This is referred to as the partitions protection domain. This 
protection domain allows for software of varying levels of security to be 
decoupled from the microkernel and other less secure applications. [8] 
A microkernel for a secure field device will compartmentalize components 
and allow the trusted computing base (TCB) to consist of only the kernel and 
trusted security-critical code in kernel mode. All other applications reside in user 
mode with limited access to the secure areas of the device. The microkernel will 
determine what trusted resources can be accessed from these less secure 
compartments and only allow access to security critical code or data when 
absolutely necessary, all through IPC calls to the kernel [9]. This small amount of 
secure code and the small size of the kernel allow for the code to be thoroughly 
checked for possible errors and unintended operation, even allowing for 
mathematical proof of the code’s operation. [8] 
OKL4 Microkernel 
To use a microkernel for security purposes, the IPC must be fast and 
efficient or else other process communications might be used, bypassing the 
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security of the kernel. Most microkernels exhibit poor IPC performance. The L4 
microkernel is built to improve the IPC performance of L3 and other pre-existing 
microkernels [10]. 
The OKL4 microkernel was designed by OK Labs as a highly flexible, high 
performance microkernel. Providing a minimal layer of hardware-abstraction on 
which modules can be built. Each component is isolated in the system from 
programming errors or malicious code introduced to the system by other 
components. A feature is only implemented in the kernel if it was impossible to 
provide the service outside of the microkernel with the same level of security. 
OKL4 provides a trust and security implementation using hardware and 
software mechanisms to enforce security. The API provides time, 
resource/memory, communication protection, and fault isolation. Using address 
space control and IPC for each component or thread to communicate the kernel 
can create separate memory spaces for each component that are independent of 
one another. These cells are completely isolated and can only communicate 
through IPC.  Each call is verified through the security model that the component 
has access rights to the hardware, data, or other component it is trying to 
communicate with, therefore containing malicious code or activity to an 






SEL4 is a mathematically verified version of the OKL4 microkernel. Since the 
microkernel is the only part of the operating system that executes in the 
privileged mode of the hardware, there is no protection from faults occurring in 
the kernel. Every bug could potentially cause physical damage. The kernel is a 
major part of the TCB that can bypass security. 
Using an interactive, machine-assisted and machine-checked proof the SEL4 
microkernel was formally verified. This does not mean it is necessarily secure, 
but that it has been mathematically verified that the C code operates specifically 
as the kernel should behave. The verification was run on the C code itself. 
Therefore, the kernel itself is not verified, but the code that it was compiled from 
was verified to operate as specified. To declare the kernel as verified, one must 
also assumed the correctness of the C compiler, linker, assembly code, 






It is shown in Chapter II that operating system security in field devices 
cannot be guaranteed. To help deal with this issue, the microkernel was 
designed as a horizontal approach to abstraction based on modules instead of a 
layered monolithic kernel approach. This allows the kernel to segregate memory 
and permissions based on the needs of the module and can help unwanted 
access by a corrupt piece of software from accessing all areas of the device.  
The SEL4 microkernel is designed and verified as correct, and operates 
discussed in Chapter II. The experiment is designed around the SEL4 microkernel 
to determine speed in which communication can be achieved between processes 
in a secure environment. 
Security Model 
The security for this project is based off the OPSAID [4] security project 
discussed in Chapter II. The several aspects of field device security provided by 
OPSAID are listed below and their relevance to the project is stated. Using these 
security upgrades for field devices the security and performance of devices can 
be tested. 
Virtual private networking and encryption is necessary in modern devices. 
Any device operating on the Internet should be located behind a firewall 
preventing unwanted access. To enter these networks and gain full access to 
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their resources it is necessary to virtualize a private network. A private network is 
intended to be used only by the devices physically connected to the local 
network, where security should be less of a concern. These networks were 
common before the Internet. Now, with the invent of virtualized networking, it is 
possible to encrypt a tunnel into a network and allow remote devices to be 
included in a private network. Only devices on the private, hopefully encrypted, 
network are authorized to communicate with the device. This does not need to 
be supported by the device directly, but by some gateway device on the 
network, although, it can be internalized to the device as it is in the OPSAID 
project. 
Firewall services are included in the OPSAID standard architecture. A 
firewall is a software tool used to deny communications from certain processes, 
programs, ports or specific devices. This is useful for blocking unwanted 
programs from finding an open port on a device or a network. Only approved 
processes have access to the network. Malicious software running on the device 
will not be able to create an outside connection without meeting the policy of the 
firewall. Most home computers and home routers will have some firewall policy 
that will try and protect the machine. This is common in the PC network 
environment and should be used for field devices as well. A custom policy can be 
implemented to not hinder the current functions of the device, but protect from 
dangerous software and DDOS attacks. 
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Network intrusion detection systems are used to detect and notify the 
network administrator of an unauthorized program or user on the network. 
Typically, these systems operate by analyzing network traffic for suspicious or 
malicious activity. The use of these systems can be beneficial to any network, 
but particularly to those that control expensive/dangerous equipment or contain 
sensitive information. The software can potentially detect an intruder and in 
some cases severe the connection to the network. In the event that a program 
or user has bypassed the virtual network security and the firewall for the 
network, this additional software could be the added layer necessary to finally 
stop communication with the device. 
If a user can get on the network and send commands to a device, the 
network intrusion detection has a chance to stop them. However, if they 
penetrate software on the device itself, there may not be suspicious network 
activity. Host intrusion detection systems cover this base by monitoring and 
analyzing internals of the system. Host security typically consists of watching 
memory for unverified modifications, be it to a database or program memory 
depending on the device and its uses. Using checksums of file sizes, date 
attributes, and permissions, the system can check for changes that were not 
authorized. Host security may not prevent access to sensitive information, but it 
can warn the owner of the information that it has been accessed and possibly 




Event logging can be useful in determining the fault when a problem does 
occur. Problems in electronic devices occur for many reasons; sometimes these 
reasons cannot be determined. For security, the device or the owner needs to 
know if the error was a software/hardware fault or was caused by mischievous 
activity. Event logging allows for the device to keep records of errors. These 
records can contain timestamps, user with access, the process that initiated the 
error, and other vital information that can help the owner determine if the 
device’s security has been compromised. Event logging is also helpful if an 
accident occurs in the vicinity of a piece of equipment. The device may have 
logged activities in the error, from its current operating level, process, or duty to 
sensor data at the time of the accident; which can be useful for troubleshooting 
or to determine user error. 
Event storage and alert generation are related to event logging. The logged 
data can be stored in a database for later analysis and any error logs can 
generate an alert for the device owner. The owner can be notified in real time of 
an error instead of having to discover the event own their own. If an error occurs 
the device can instantly send an alert via the Internet or internal network so that 
the error can be dealt with without unnecessary downtime, be it an intruder, 
hardware failure, or software error. 
Session logging is used to determine what commands were sent to the 
device and when. When the device is accessed remotely or physically, all actions 
are logged to determine when a configuration problem was caused. The device 
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can benefit from logging changes, as the owner knows what was changed and 
can quickly and successfully reconfigure the device. The reconfiguration can be 
automated to return the device to a previous configuration with ease when a 
fault is detected.  
Field devices, which originally were accessed only via an isolated a physical 
network, are now connected using Internet technologies. When isolated, access 
to the device was granted by lock and key; now these devices can be remotely 
accessed, potentially through corporate networks, from anywhere in the world. 
No need to identify a user was necessary if they had physical access to the 
device, but this is no longer standard. Every electronic network needs some sort 
of authentication to keep access limited to only privileged users. A minimalistic 
user authentication and password protection is standard on most PC networks 
and that is the level of security trying to be reached by the OPSAID project for 
field devices. Therefore, there needs to be a built in software mechanism to 
authenticate the user on the device, whether this be a username and password 
or some other means of verified user authentication. 
Remote device management already exists, but could be much more 
secure. Device management is an important part of having a device, occasionally 
it will need to be reconfigured or the logs accessed. This should be done through 
secure software that has access rights to all of the software listed above. This 
software should be used to view or download the logs, sessions, alerts, firewall 
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policy, and any other device configuration from one easy resource that can be 
accessed securely and remotely. 
All of this software already exists. It is waiting to be installed and 
configured for use in field devices and SCADA systems to help protect the device 
and ensure normal operation. Without these additional software products, a 
device is vulnerable to many types of attacks and the results can be devastating. 
Every device should be secured in some way, but Internet enabled devices or 
any that can accessed remotely need to have many added layers of security to 
prevent unwanted access and malicious software actions. 
 
Prior Work 
Security has been a concern in field and SCADA devices for some time. This 
is not a new area of research. The OPSAID project sets a plan for implementing 
better security in these devices. The Lemnos project adds to the security of the 
modules installed on the device and interoperability between the devices without 
the added level of security impeding the functionality of the device. 
There has been work done in security hardened field devices and operating 
system security for the devices. Some of the work mentioned in Chapter II needs 
to be detailed further as it is important to the development of the experiment 
and the need for the research. Graham and Hieb [8] have researched the need 
for SCADA security and the inherent issues of securing the devices. Through 
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their research they have concluded a number of possible future research 
directions for the field. Using an isolated kernel, the device could possibly be 
much more secure. Using the OKL4 microkernel as a means of isolating separate 
processes, the experiment explored IPC communication on hardware and its 
effectiveness for security applications.  
The research of Graham and Hieb was continued by Luyster [9]. His 
research involved developing a prototype based on the hardened security 
research using the OKL4 microkernel for RTU control devices and industrial 
embedded systems. The research suggested that the added layers of security 
added 20 to 100 milliseconds of delay to IPC calls that typically took 500 
microseconds to complete. The research suggests there is a need to test how 
security additions and IPC calls function on a more secure verified kernel, such 
as the SEL4 microkernel, now commercially available. 
Memory Isolation 
The SEL4 microkernel allows for all cells to be isolated from each other 
within memory. No process may read or modify the memory space of another 
process. The only communication between the processes is via IPC through the 
kernel. This allows for a more secure environment than one user space for all of 
the components of the system to access. 
A cell is a concept unique to security software. The OKL4 microkernel 
isolates specific memory for usage in the cells and allocates these addresses to 
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only one process. The memory used in these cells is stored in the large bank of 
memory for the device, typically RAM. This is virtual addressed by the processor 
and then allocated to a thread, process, or to an entire cell. This allocation is 
referred to as a protection domain. This is a memory segment that is completely 
isolated from all other memory segments virtually. There is no way for memory 
within a protection domain to be accessed by any other processes than the one 
to which it was allocated.  
For this isolation to be possible, no software can have access to direct 
memory mapping except the kernel. Any other software must use virtual memory 
addresses that are mapped one to one with physical memory. These virtual 
memory addresses are then translated by the kernel. The processes and cells 
have no way of determining absolute memory locations, this is vital to the 
security of the memory segments. This is in contrast to typical monolithic kernels 
which allow device drivers and other software modules in the kernel space 
unrestricted access to the entirety of the system memory. 
Like cells, threads operate within a protection domain. However, multiple 
threads can exist within a single protection domain, whereas multiple cells 
cannot. A cell can be thought of more like a program, that can have a single 






In the OKL4 and SEL4 microkernels, all communication between different 
components must be done through IPC calls. There are two types of IPC calls in 
the OKL4 architecture. These calls are referred to as blocking and non-blocking 
calls. Blocking calls will stop a process or thread until the corresponding IPC call 
has completed, either sending or receiving. This is useful if the thread is waiting 
on access to a locked component and needs the information to continue, 
however, the possibility exists for a race condition in this situation and it should 
be avoided where possible. Non-blocking calls will immediately attempt to send 
or receive the desired IPC call, but may fail if the other component is locked or 
unready for the call. The failure can be handled in software and the component 
can wait to send or receive again or continue with the process. This is important 
to avoid race conditions as a failure is easy to deal with, but a locked process 
waiting on a device that may never be ready can be devastating to a system 
unless designed to operate where these situations cannot exist, such as a state 
machine. 
Summary of Design Consederation 
It has been suggested that using existing security software available now 
that the security of field and SCADA devices can be greatly enhanced. By using 
some or all of the layered security described by the OPSAID project above, a 
device may be updated/upgraded to be compatible with corporate secure 
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computer networks without posing significant security risks from outside users 
and malicious software on the network.  
However, these network and device protocols are not secure enough. The 
device must also protect itself from malicious components installed on the device 
itself. Using microkernels and software designed for memory isolation the device 
can protect from unwanted access to hardware and secure data. These 
components must be able to communicate securely with the device and the 
other components in the system. This is all possible and an experiment will be 
designed in Chapter IV to show some of the features of these more secure 






The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate whether, or not, while using proper 
security protocols and methodologies, reasonable performance can still be 
achieved in kernel communication. The design is based on the OKL4 wombat 
Linux kernel and its provided image. This para-virtualized distribution of Linux 
runs on the OKL4 kernel, more specifically on the SEL4 microkernel in this 
experiment, and is an entire functional operating system with virtualized 
hardware that can communicate with the actual hardware through the base 
microkernel. The operating system can also communicate with other system 
components that are running in separate cells. 
Using two wombat distributions and the SEL4 microkernel, it can be shown 
that secure communication can be achieved, that its performance is reasonable, 
and that isolated components can operate independently of each other without 
risk of corruption from the other component.  
The SEL4 system image was built on an Ubuntu Linux machine using a 
dedicated cross compiler for the x86 architecture designed for compiling for a 
generic x86 machine using only the most basic generic hardware. The tool is 
Crosstool-ng and has cross compiling capabilities for many architectures. The 
cross compiler compiled the wombat supervisor, timing server, and all other 
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SEL4 components to be run on the kernel. The kernel was delivered precompiled 
and was not rebuilt during this experiment.  
The kernel modules for this experiment were compiled using the same cross 
compiler. The default module settings were used with the exception of one. Net 
filter was not compiled due to compiler errors and was unnecessary for the 
experiment, therefore was excluded. The module configuration is included in the 
appendix. 
Many different IPC and other SEL4 programs were compiled. The wombat 
supervisor, the program used to load a paravirtualized Linux image into memory, 
was compiled and configured to load two identical images in parallel. The timing 
server was compiled using the default settings and is included with every 
Wombat Linux image as Linux cannot function without a system clock and the 
hardware clock is unavailable to the SEL4 kernel.  
Hardware Emulation 
The Ubuntu Linux machine used to compile the test system was emulated 
using Sun Virtualbox. This was for convenience as it is entirely portable between 
the different locations and computers used for the testing. The test system itself 
was emulated using Qemu as the generic x86 system. An emulated system was 
chosen, originally, to easily start and stop the system multiple times during 
testing. It was shown in later testing that the system could be booted on actual 
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hardware, however serial output was garbled, and efforts to correct this were 
unsuccessful. 
The Qemu machine must be operated in a Linux environment, because the 
Windows build of Qemu cannot display the debug output from the SEL4 kernel. 
As no Linux machines were easily available for the experiment and the Virtualbox 
Ubuntu machine used for compiling was already configured for testing and 
included the compiled image, it was used for the Qemu test machine as well. 
The Qemu SEL4 hardware is therefore emulated in the Ubuntu virtual machine. 
Meaning, for the tests, the program is running on an emulator in an emulator. 
This will affect the overall performance of the results. If the experiments are 
compared to each other, the performance should be affected equally and 
therefore the relative results will show a feasibility and performance increase or 
decrease even in a doubly emulated test bed. 
Software 
The software for this experiment includes the SEL4 microkernel, the 
Wombat Linux image, and custom IPC examples running on the microkernel. The 
code for IPC examples is included in an appendix. The Wombat images will be 
used for in operating system testing of IPC speeds and cell to cell IPC 
communication between two Wombat images. 
The IPC examples will show the speed and effectiveness of IPC on the 
lowest level of the SEL4 kernel. Building a program directly on the kernel will 
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yield the best results. The IPC program will make use of multiple threads to 
communicate through the kernel between the memory segregated threads via 
IPC.  
 
Figure 4.1: Communication in SEL4 and Memory Segmentation 
The experiment will contain IPC calls from the userland built on the 
Wombat Linux cell. This program will run within the paravirtualized Linux 
environment and make IPC writing and reading calls to the kernel. The program 
can only communicate with the Linux API, as if it was a standard distribution, 
and cannot access directly any other cell or hardware. The Linux cell must then 
relay the information to the kernel that will write the IPC call to the appropriate 
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register on hardware. The IPC cell, if it wished to read this message, would 
contact the kernel and request an IPC message. This is the only means of 
communication between cells. All programs and threads in the userland are 
dedicated to the Linux cell and cannot communicate with or be aware of the 
memory space of other cells. 
An IPC cell will also be designed to communicate with the Linux 
environment in the manner described above. This will test both the IPC 
performance in an operating system environment and directly on the kernel. 
Tests will show both performance of cell to cell, Linux to cell, and Linux to Linux 
IPC communication. 
Security Isolation and Communication 
In SEL4 memory is semi-isolated in threads and completely isolated in cells. 
The only communication between memory isolated processes is by IPC through 
the kernel API as described in Figure 4.1. For the system to be considered more 
secure than its predecessors, the software must take advantage of this isolation 
and operate within its dedicated memory space. 
Software running in the user-space of the Linux cell will be considered 
insecure on the basis that Linux is a robust monolithic operating system, even 
the small version of embedded Linux used for Wombat. There are many areas of 
the operating system that could have memory overflows or other vulnerabilities 
allowing attack or control of the system. For this reason, no program operating 
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within the Linux cell shall have access to vital data or I/O devices unless 
specifically designed and allowed to control said device. In this situation, the 
device should be dedicated to the Linux cell and not accessible from other cells 
to avoid communication bypassing IPC. 
All security software should be kept minimal as to not introduce bugs and 
operate directly on the kernel in a cell parallel to the IPC cell in Figure 4.1. See 
Figure 4.2 for visualization of security software. These secure programs can 
operate completely independent of the other cells and can control hardware, 
through microkernel calls of course. For example, a firewall cell might operate on 
the kernel and have complete control of any networked devices. The firewall 
would guard all incoming and outgoing communication. Other cells may use the 
network by IPC calls to the firewall cell. Any incoming communication would 
have to meet strict security protocols implemented in the firewall policy and be 
restricted from communication without formal authentication. This firewall cell 




Figure 4.2: Isolated cell approach, including security cells. 
Authentication and configuration of the device can also be isolated to its 
own secure cell. This makes the likelihood of introducing a security flaw into the 
software much less than running all of the security programs on the same 
system where they must interact with each other. Complexity of the 
programming can be exploited to introduce security bugs. This configuration cell 
will allow a user to log into the device, perhaps remotely via the firewall/limited 
VPN features, and configure the device. No configuration should be possible 
except through this cell if it is to be a secure device. Logging programs can also 
be implemented in the same way, as parallel cells. 
A less secure VPN could be possible into the Linux environment. There 
would be no security risk in allowing this unless critical data or processes are 
implemented within the Linux environment. Any VPN access to Linux would not 
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be able to communicate outside of the cell. This should be done only through a 
dedicated networking interface or virtualized networking interface to avoid 
contact with other cells or hardware they are using. The VPN features in the 
firewall or networking manager could be programmed to allow for a virtualized 
device that would be able to reach Linux via IPC. This would be complex, but 
more secure than allowing Linux direct access to the network where other device 
might be less secure and on a closed network. 
This experiment was conducted to test the IPC performance and usability of 
these secure cells. As stated above, all cells will communicate by IPC. If this 
system of communication is too slow or suffers from excessive use and the 
number of possible cells must be limited, the whole security scheme of this 
device may be impractical. The architecture example used above hinges on the 
ability to isolate every security component in its own virtual space. Without a 
secure, readily available, and efficient method of communication, the 








To test the security of the software, the added layers of security must first 
be integrated into either a cell or the Linux image. The cell programs, running 
directly on the microkernel, are written in the C programming language and 
compiled using the SEL4 library. They are then loaded into memory immediately 
after the microkernel. Dite is a memory mapping program used to integrate the 
cells into the kernel image. Dite is used to make the kernel executable from a 
boot loader such as Grub. Grub was used in all of the testing in this experiment 
to load the kernel, which then took possession of the hardware and loaded the 
security cells or Linux paravirtualized kernel and image. Four security programs 
were tested in the experiment and are described in the following sections. 
Cell IPC 
IPC was implemented in a separate security cell for performance testing. 
Running IPC straight on the kernel has added benefits to performance and 
shows how cell to cell communication will be handled and preform in a secure 
field device. The IPC program uses two threads within the same cell to 
communicate via IPC through the SEL4 microkernel.  
The IPC test was modified from the included IPC cell example distributed 
with the SEL4 microkernel and was understood using the SEL4 microkernel 
manual explaining all of the available kernel calls in the API. Modifications were 
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made to include timing for performance testing. The added timing component 
was never completed due to the faux calls in the API. The time.h and clock.h 
files included with the kernel never contact the hardware clock available to the 
system. This created complications. The first attempt was to write code that 
would display the time passed between sending and receiving IPC messages in 
microseconds. This yielded a return of 0, which was obviously incorrect. The 
code was then modified to return the clock cycles past between sending and 
receiving. Knowing that the system was running at 100MHZ allowed the user to 
calculate the time passed between calls. This as well returned 0. Upon further 
investigation it was found that the clock and time functions existed in the API, 
but were set to do nothing but return 0. It appears that these functions were 
included for completeness so that compiling errors were not caused by lack of 
proper available headers, but the code in the headers was never actually 
connected to the hardware. This is not documented in the API, but was 
discovered when viewing the header files in the API itself. Without a hardware 
clock, cell timing performance data could not be gathered. 
After completing the cell code, the code is then compiled using the standard 
GCC C compiler on Linux configured to cross compile for the target system. Dite 
then integrates the compiled program with the microkernel. The image is put 
onto a bootable memory stick or hard drive containing the GRUB boot loader. 
GRUB is instructed to boot the image on hardware, which consists of placing the 
microkernel and cell data into memory and passing off rights to the processor 
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and other hardware to the microkernel. The microkernel prepares itself for 
operation and starts the secure cell program. The IPC program runs and outputs 
the test message transmitted from one thread to another. The first thread writes 
a message to the IPC register, which is hardware dependent, and then the 
second thread reads the register through kernel calls. The message is displayed 
and if transmitted properly should be the same from sending to receiving. This is 
done three times and then the program exits. 
It was found that the Qemu machine allows for the ttyS0 output data to be 
redirected to a telnet server. This was used to analyze the performance of the 
IPC calls. Since it was not feasible to time the calls directly in on the microkernel, 
timing data was taken in between the written string data that attempted to send 
the message and the string data that successfully received the IPC message. 
This is less accurate due to the overhead required for writing the messages, 
sending the data across the virtualized network interface to the telnet client, and 
the extra components of the IPC message program that had to run between 
sending and receiving messages, but is favorable to not receiving any 
performance data. Table 5.1 shows the results collected from the telnet log. 
Putty, an open source telnet client, was modified to write timestamp data to the 
log file allowing for timing calculations. Putty was modified for the experiment to 
timestamp in seconds, this was not accurate enough and Windows operating 
systems do not have a timer that is more accurate than milliseconds. It was 
attempted to accurately time to the microsecond level, but the microsecond file 
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timer in Windows calculates accurately, but only updates every 10 or more 
milliseconds rendering it useless for timing calculations. It was found that a 
precompiled fork of Putty named ExtraPutty timestamps correctly on the 
millisecond level, therefore this program was used to collect the streaming data 
from the microkernel and log it in text file for the experiment. Since millisecond 
timing was not preferable, the IPC program was again modified to complete 
more than three iterations between the threads and the average time was 
calculated for IPC messages. 
Table of IPC Message Performance 
Iterations Total Time Time (ms) Average Time (ms) 
1,000 00:02:165 2165 2.165 
10,000 00:20:647 20647 2.065 
128,000 04:02:565 242565 1.895 
128,000 04:03:692 243698 1.904 
500,000 17:29:266 1049266 2.099 
1,000,000 34:11:824 2051824 2.052 
Table 5.1 – IPC Message Performance 
As shown in Table 5.1, the average time to send and receive an IPC 
message is between 1.895 ms and 2.165 ms. The performance can be increased 
if timing took into account only the sending and receiving of a message. 
However, this data, including the overhead for timing and the running IPC 
program, shows that the performance on a 100MHz field device is not too 
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constrained to obstruct the cells from operating in a useful manner and finding 
an alternative means of speedier communication between cells is unnecessary. 
The IPC cell operates as expected. The messages transmitted are identical 
to the messages received. However, the actual speed performance data was not 
gathered in the virtualized machine due to microkernel constraints; we must rely 
on the external timing data. This proves that it is possible to write a secure cell 
and implement it on the microkernel, that IPC functions do work as expected, 
and that other security software should be written from scratch and not rely on 
the API if at all possible as there may be other unexpected functions that are 
unavailable. 
Linux VPN Server 
Other security features are implemented inside the Linux image to be run 
on a higher level operating system. A VPN program was compiled and installed 
within Linux. For the purposes of this experiment it is unnecessary to be able to 
access the VPN from the actual network, it was compiled and configured to allow 
access only from the loopback networking device. This security addition shows it 
is possible to add LEMNOS/OPSAID suggested programs within the embedded 
Linux installation making access to the device easier and more secure. 
The VPN server program, PeerVPN 0.023, is open source and distributed in 
C. It was compiled on the Ubuntu testing machine using the standard GCC 
compiler configured to cross compile for the target architecture. A configuration 
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file is also necessary for the program to run successfully. This is configured from 
the test machine. The program and config file are then entered into the static 
Linux image and can be run from the Linux environment. 
The Linux image used in this experiment contains a basic root file system 
structured as a standard Linux operating system, known as “/”. Programs that 
need to accessed by Linux must be located in this file system. It was decided 
that any added programs would be put in the folder located at “/bin” which is 
already included in the root users “path” so that it can be called from the 
command line without added navigation through the file system. Almost all of the 
commands available to the root user are located in the “/bin” directory, or 
included as a symbolic link if they are elsewhere located. This is standard 
practice in Linux environment configuration. 
To add an item to the “/bin” directory in the already preconfigured image 
requires one of two processes; either the entire image is recreated for the target 
architecture using a program called Bitbake for embedded systems and testing, 
or the image must be unpacked, modified, and repacked in a format that Linux 
will recognize. The first process was initially tested, however several of the 
source servers for Bitbake (of which there are 165) were consistently 
unavailable. This made compiling Bitbake for testing impossible, causing this 
process to be abandoned for the second option of unpacking and manually 
modifying the image. 
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The image is packed in a CPIO image. Using the CPIO tool in Linux, it is 
possible to unpack the image into a directory. The compiled program and 
configuration file can then be moved to the “~/image/bin” directory if the image 
directory is located in the users home directory. It is necessary to copy the VPN 
program with root privileges, as all of the image directory will have root only 
access rights and a normal user will be unable to add programs. This can be 
done from the command line by tediously typing the directories out or from a 
GUI program if the test machine has a program file exploring program with root 
access. The Ubuntu test machine does not have such a program, but if the user 
is comfortable on the command line it should not be a problem. Almost 
everything, including programming, in this experiment was done from the 
command line. After the program is successfully copied to the images binary 
directory, the image can be repacked. Repacking is slightly more difficult than 
unpacking, it must be done with root access rights, find all files recursively in all 
subdirectories, and be put into “newc” format. Using the MAN pages of the CPIO 
command will instruct the user how to pack into the “newc” format required for a 
Linux image. The format for images was not documented anywhere for SEL4, 
but was discovered later when images refused to boot. The provided static 
image for use with the Wombat Linux kernel was received with no 
documentation or explanation for modification. 
With a successfully modified file system image, the system can be 
instructed to MAKE the wombat supervisor, timing server, and use Dite to 
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package them both along with the microkernel and the file system image just 
created. The location of the image is specified in the make file for the whole 
wombat image. The microkernel image will be made and can be booted similarly 
to the IPC image in the previous section, by placing it in memory accessible from 
the GRUB boot loader. 
Once the microkernel has finished setup and boots the paravirtulized Linux 
kernel, the Linux kernel will find the root file system and leave the user at a login 
prompt. The only user in the Wombat kernel is “root”. Once logged in, the user 
is left at a standard BASH command prompt. The “PeerSVN” program can then 
be accessed by calling it directly from the command line. It will start and leave 
the server waiting for a connection on the loopback Ethernet device. 
Linux VPN Client 
Running a VPN server on the field device is useful if it is a primary SCADA 
device, however if it is used for collection and sensors it may have to respond to 
an outside server for instruction and reporting. In this case, it would be 
necessary for the device to contain a VPN client to connect to the main servers 
VPN server to create a secure  connection. 
Similar to the previous section, an open source VPN client package was 
cross compiled for the target device and configured. It was then placed in the file 
system image exactly as the VPN server was implemented. This yielded 
successful results proving that both client and server programs may be ran on 
43 
 
the device as required. A successful VPN connection was not tested for the 
experiment, but the client ran and reported correctly. It is believed that the client 
is fully functional, but more testing is required to make certain that it was 
implemented correctly and can be used to create a secure connection from the 
device to an OPSAID server. 
Linux IPC Program 
An IPC program was written to be operated from within the Linux 
environment, in hopes of testing cell to cell communication between two Linux 
Wombat kernels operating in separate cells. The SEL4 API library was completely 
modified to allow it to compile a standard Linux application. The modification of 
the SEL4 library was successful from a compilation standpoint, however the 
microkernel has denied access to many of these functions from higher operating 
systems. The software was written similar to the IPC cell program, it would send 
an IPC message to the register specified for the target architecture and then try 
to read the message. 
The program was successfully compiled and placed into the Linux image via 
the same process listed in the previous two sections. The system was then 
booted and the program was tested. The timing functions, being that the 
program is now in an environment with proper time and clock functions using the 
Linux timing server, now work as expected. The IPC message is sent, but the 
microkernel responds with an message interpreted as an access denied error and 
the read function finds a 0 instead of the intended message. It is believed that it 
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is impossible to access microkernel functions from within Linux, at least not by 
the method described above. Little help could be found on the subject and the 
Linux IPC cell to cell experiment was abandoned. The code, along with all other 







This thesis demonstrated the design, implementation, and testing of a 
secure field device based on a verified microkernel. The SEL4 microkernel and 
software can be implemented on real hardware and further tested using the 
previous chapters as a guide for set-up and software configuration. It is hoped 
that this research and experimentation has built the foundation for a more 
secure device.  
Summary 
The virtual prototype presented in this thesis has shown that a secure, 
memory isolated field device can be implemented. Using open source software, 
the device can be affordable and configured for any data collection or control 
device. The OPSAID system requirements can be met or exceeded without any 
additional hardware. The x86 hardware architecture used in the prototype could 
be ported to ARM without much difficulty using similar methods to the building 
and compiling of the current x86 system. 
The security software implemented in the current design shows that nearly 
any necessary software can be implemented as well. If the secure rules outlined 
in Chapter II for communication are followed most software could be ported to 
the device. It was shown that programs can be compiled for either the higher 
Linux operating system or to run directly on the microkernel for an efficient and 
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secure program with its own isolated memory space. Programs were created for 
and tested in both the Linux environment and directly on the microkernel. 
It was observed that if the security program required any outside libraries, 
or was not fairly straight forward to implement, that it was much less labor 
intensive to create the program for the Linux environment. The microkernel 
libraries are limited and incomplete in some places such as access to any sort of 
clock or timer. Programs created to run in their own cell directly on the 
microkernel should have a specific intended purpose and perform that purpose in 
the simplest possible way to avoid creating security bugs. Only security critical 
processes, or those that require direct hardware access, should be implemented 
in their own cells. A program or process that is convoluted and has additional, 
unnecessary features would be best placed in the Linux environment. The Linux 
system offers a full-fledged operating system API for a virtualized set of 
hardware and interaction with the operating system. This allows for less 
challenging programming and cross compilation.  
The programs tested performed well for their intended functions. The two 
VPN programs compiled for the Linux environment show that a secure device can 
be used as both a client and a server device; this shows the flexibility of the 
security software. Most standard Linux applications could be compiled for the 
device. The VPN software was standard open source software available freely on 
the Internet for use in any Linux system, opening the door for any security 
application available to be implemented in the device. The microkernel 
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application was a modified version of the multi-threaded IPC example included 
with the SEL4 microkernel. Until it become a standard architecture, it is unlikely 
that an implementation of this device would be able to make use of off-the-shelf 
software for single purpose secure cells. These cells would have to be custom 
created for the purposes of the device, but it was shown that the software can 
function in a private cell. The limitations of these security cells are determined by 
the hardware, the microkernel API, and the creativity of the programmer. 
Future Research 
There is a great need for a secure field device. This experiment and the 
prior work is a great start, but there is still much to be done. The road to an 
effective security device is not a short one. With small strides, each contributing 
researcher is moving the field ahead, with the goal being a completely secured, 
inexpensive field device with interchangeable security programs and a 
standardized design. 
If this experiment were to continue there are a few things that should still 
be tested. The most important next step is implementing the device in real 
hardware. The virtualized environment worked great for the experiment, but it 
would be a leap forward to actually create the device in a useable state. A 
generic x86 computer was used for hardware testing, but the output was garbled 
for some reason. This was not a problem on the virtual console. For the design 
presented in the previous chapters to be useful it would have to be shown to 
work on hardware. 
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Further research into the current design of this device should also test cell 
to cell IPC messages. The prototype described in chapter V showed IPC 
communication in a single cell between multiple threads. This is a great start for 
microkernel secure communication, but is not of much use without continuing 
experimentation. For IPC to be useful, it needs to be used to communicate 
between memory isolated processes as it was intended. Preferably, the device 
would communicate between two dedicated security cells that had a purpose 
other than testing the IPC; for instance, the firewall cell would successfully send 
messages to and authentication cell. 
It was not determined whether it was possible for the Linux environment to 
communicate with outside cells using IPC. If this is possible, two wombat Linux 
cells should be created side by side as detailed in chapter V, but have an 
additional IPC application to communicate with one another. It would be 
beneficial to the device to have multiple Linux environments for the programs 
that require Linux libraries to still be isolated, but be able to communicate with 
each other and all of the other secure cells directly on the microkernel. Two 
wombat images were designed and tested during the experiment, but the IPC 
communication could not be shown to function correctly inside the Linux 
environment. 
The software used in the experiment should be ported to the ARM 
architecture. It seems common for SCADA devices to use ARM processors for the 
price and power consumption. The SEL4 microkernel is available on both ARM 
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and x86. It would be beneficial to test all of the software on both systems to 
reach the greatest possible audience for the secure device. This should not be a 
difficult task, but was not included in the experiment due to time constraints.  
Finally, the device should be thoroughly tested for vulnerabilities. Unless all 
of the software on the device is tested, the device cannot truly be considered 
secure. It should be reasonable to assume that any intrusion into a single cell 
should not compromise the other software, but that is no reason not to test each 
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The appendices section contains the build configurations for the SEL4 
microkernel system and any custom code developed and used during the 
experiment. Any code not included was not used to collect data, not original to 




# This file contains build configuration variables 
 







# Comment out the line below to build a non-debug kernel and userland 
export SEL4_DEBUG_KERNEL=1 
 
# Compile in IOMMU functions 
export IOMMU=1 
 













# Sanity check the toolchain to ensure it really does exist. 
ifeq($(strip$(wildcard${CROSSBINPATH}/${TOOLPREFIX}gcc${TOOLSUFFIX})),) 





# Capability dumps (used by the CapDL Extrator tool) go out on this second 
# serial port. 
export SEL4_CMDLINE="debug=0x2f8" 
 
# Tell the build where Wombat's prebuilt root filesystem image (in "cpio" 
# format) is located. If a root filesystem image is not provided, wombat 
# will panic on boot. A full path must be specified. 
ROOTFS=${PWD}/misc/image.cpio 
 




# The supervisor config file. There are found in: 








    enum device_name wombat0_devices[] = { 
        HARDWARE_NIC_0, HARDWARE_CONSOLE, 0}; 
    enum device_name wombat1_devices[] = { 
        HARDWARE_NIC_1, HARDWARE_CONSOLE_NO_IRQ, 0}; 
 
    /* Setup a timer server, and two wombats. */ 
    struct component *timer = register_timer_server_component( 
            DEFAULT_TIMER_SERVER_PRIO); 
    struct component *wombat0 = register_wombat_component( 
            0, "rdinit=/sbin/init wombat0", wombat0_devices, 200, 
            DEFAULT_WOMBAT_PRIO); 
    struct component *wombat1 = register_wombat_component( 
            1, "rdinit=/sbin/init wombat1", wombat1_devices, 200, 
            249); 
 
    /* Connect the timer server to the wombats. */ 
    SYSTEM_CONNECTIONS[0] = (connection_t) 




    SYSTEM_CONNECTIONS[1] = (connection_t) 




#endif /* _SYSTEM_TWO_WOMBATS_H_ */ 
 
Custom Code 













#define STACK_SIZE (1 << seL4_PageBits) 
static seL4_CPtr ipc_endpoint = 0;  
 
#define MASK(x) ((1<<(x))-1) 
 
//The new thread will begin executing this function 
static void my_other_thread(void) { 
  printf("\nHello World, this is \"%s\"\n",__FUNCTION__); 
 
  //Create a message tag that specifies that the first message  
  //register should be transferred when an IPC message is sent 
  seL4_MessageInfo tag = { {.length = 1} }; 
  seL4_Word mr0 = 0; 
    
  //Loop forever calling the endpoint 
  while(1){ 
    printf("%s: Sent message %d of length %d to endpoint %p.\n\n", 
      __FUNCTION__, 
      mr0, 
      tag.length, 




    //Set the contents of the first message register.  
    seL4_SetMR(0,mr0); 
    //Make the call 
    tag = seL4_Call(ipc_endpoint,tag);       
    //Get the contents of the first message register. This was 
    //transferred from the thread that replied to the call. 
    mr0 = seL4_GetMR(0);    
     
    printf("%s: Received message %d of length %d from endpoint %p.\n", 
      __FUNCTION__, 
      mr0, 
      tag.length, 
      (void*)ipc_endpoint); 
 
    mr0++; 




int main(void) { 
 
  //Get a pointer to the bootinfo structure from libsel4 
  seL4_BootInfo* info = seL4_GetBootInfo(); 
  unsigned int i; 
 
  printf("\n IPC Test\n\n"); 
   
  //Find the first free slot in the CSpace 
  printf("Finding the first free slot in the CSpace...");  
  seL4_CPtr free_slot = 0; 
  for (i = 0; i < info->regionCount; i++) { 
    if(info->regions[i].type == seL4_Region_FreeSlots){ 
      free_slot = info->regions[i].base; 
      printf("found at %p.\n", (void *)free_slot); 
      break; 
    } 
  } 
  assert(i != info->regionCount); 
 
  //Find the first empty region in the CSpace 
  printf("Finding the first free empty in the CSpace...");  
  seL4_CPtr empty_slot = 0; 
  for (i = 0; i < info->regionCount; i++) { 
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    if(info->regions[i].type == seL4_Region_Empty){ 
      empty_slot = info->regions[i].base; 
      printf("found at %p.\n", (void *)empty_slot); 
      break; 
    } 
  } 
  assert(i != info->regionCount); 
  seL4_Word vaddr = empty_slot;  
 
  //Find the first small block cap 
  printf("Finding the first Small Block (4K Untyped Capability) ...");      
  seL4_CPtr four_k_untyped = 0; 
  for (i = 0; i < info->regionCount; i++) {    
    if(info->regions[i].type == seL4_Region_SmallBlocks){ 
      four_k_untyped = info->regions[i].base; 
    printf("found at %p.\n",(void *)four_k_untyped); 
    break; 
    } 
  } 
  assert(i != info->regionCount); 
 
  //Retype the a small block to a TCB 
  printf("Retyping small block to a TCB..."); 
  seL4_Untyped_Retype_t rresult = seL4_Untyped_Retype(  
    four_k_untyped,  
    seL4_TCBObject,  
    0,  
    seL4_SelfCSpace,  
    free_slot >> seL4_PageBits, 
    seL4_WordBits - seL4_PageBits,  
    free_slot & MASK(seL4_PageBits),  
    1); 
  printf("created %d cap(s) at %p.\n",rresult.result,(void*)free_slot); 
  seL4_CPtr thread_TCB = free_slot;   
  assert(!rresult.error); 
 
  //Go to the next small block and the next free slot 
  four_k_untyped++; 
  free_slot++; 
   
  //Retype the small block into an endpoint object 
  printf("Retyping small block to an endpoint object..."); 
  rresult = seL4_Untyped_Retype(  
    four_k_untyped,  
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    seL4_EndpointObject,  
    0,  
    seL4_SelfCSpace,  
    free_slot >> seL4_PageBits, 
    seL4_WordBits - seL4_PageBits,  
    free_slot & MASK(seL4_PageBits),  
    1); 
  assert(!rresult.error);  
  printf("created %d cap(s) at %p.\n",rresult.result,(void*)free_slot); 
  ipc_endpoint = free_slot;   
  
  //Go to the next small block and the next free slot 
  four_k_untyped++; 
  free_slot++; 
 
  //Retype the small block into a 4K frame for the IPC buffer 
  printf("Retyping small block to an 4K frame..."); 
  rresult = seL4_Untyped_Retype(  
    four_k_untyped,  
#ifdef IA32 
    seL4_IA32_4K,  
#else 
    seL4_ARM_SmallPageObject, 
#endif 
    0,  
    seL4_SelfCSpace,  
    free_slot >> seL4_PageBits, 
    seL4_WordBits - seL4_PageBits,  
    free_slot & MASK(seL4_PageBits),  
    1); 
  assert(!rresult.error);  
  printf("created %d cap(s) at %p.\n",rresult.result,(void*)free_slot); 
  seL4_Word four_k = free_slot;   
   
  printf("Mapping 4K frame (%p) to free vadd (%p).\n", (void *)four_k, 
(void*)empty_slot); 
#ifdef IA32 
  int result = seL4_IA32_Page_Map( 
#else 
  int result = seL4_ARM_Page_Map( 
#endif 
    four_k, 
    seL4_SelfVSpace, 
    empty_slot, 
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    seL4_AllRights,  
#ifdef IA32 
    seL4_IA32_Default_VMAttributes); 
#else 
    seL4_ARM_Default_VMAttributes); 
#endif 
  assert(!result);  
   
  //Set up new thread's IPC buffer 
  printf("Setting up IPC buffer on new thread..."); 
  result = seL4_TCB_SetIPCBuffer( 
    thread_TCB, 
    vaddr, 
    four_k); 
  assert(!result);  
   
  //Set up the VSpace and CSpace on the new thread 
  printf("Setting TCB CSpace and VSpace.."); 
  result = seL4_TCB_SetSpace( 
    thread_TCB,  
    0, 
    seL4_SelfCSpace, 
    seL4_NilData, 
    seL4_SelfVSpace, 
    seL4_NilData); 
  assert(!result);  
 
   
  //Write the registers of the new thread. 
  //This sets a new thread running at the  
  //default priority 
  printf("Starting up new thread..."); 
  static char stack[STACK_SIZE];  
#ifdef IA32 
  seL4_UserContext frame = {.regs = {.eip = (unsigned int)my_other_thread, 
.esp = (unsigned int)&stack[STACK_SIZE] }}; 
#else 
  seL4_UserContext frame = {.regs = {.pc = (unsigned int)my_other_thread, .sp 
= (unsigned int)&stack[STACK_SIZE] }}; 
#endif 
  result = seL4_TCB_WriteRegisters(  
    thread_TCB, 
    true, 
    0, 
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    sizeof(seL4_UserContext) / sizeof(seL4_Word), 
    &frame); 
  assert(!result); 
   
  //Wait for someone to send us an IPC 
  seL4_Word sender_badge = 0;    
  printf("%s: Waiting on IPC...\n",__FUNCTION__); 
  seL4_MessageInfo tag = seL4_Wait( ipc_endpoint, &sender_badge);   
  seL4_Word mr0 = seL4_GetMR(0);    
  printf("%s: Recv'd message %d of length %d from endpoint %p.\n", 
    __FUNCTION__, 
    mr0, 
    tag.length, 
    (void *)ipc_endpoint); 
   
  //Repeat the cycle three times 
  for(i = 0; i < 250000; i++){ 
    //Reply to the IPC and wait for another 
    seL4_SetMR(0,++mr0);  
    printf("%s: Sent message %d of length %d to endpoint %p.\n\n", 
      __FUNCTION__, 
      mr0, 
      tag.length, 
      (void *)ipc_endpoint); 
    
    tag = seL4_ReplyWait(ipc_endpoint,tag, &sender_badge);       
    mr0 = seL4_GetMR(0);    
     
    printf("%s: Recv'd message %d of length %d from endpoint %p.\n", 
      __FUNCTION__, 
      mr0, 
      tag.length, 
      (void *)ipc_endpoint); 
  } 
 
  printf("\nDone.\n\n"); 
  return 0; 
} 
 












  time_t now; 
  time(&now); 
  
  printf("%s", ctime(&now)); 
 
 printf("\nHello World, this is \"%s\"\n","testipc"); 
 
  //Create a message tag that specifies that the first message  
  //register should be transferred when an IPC message is sent 
  seL4_MessageInfo tag = { {.length = 1} }; 
  seL4_Word mr0 = 129; 
    
    printf("%s: Sent message %d of length %d to endpoint %p.\n\n", 
      "test2", 
      mr0, 
      tag.length, 
      (void *)0x0000006d); 
 
    //Set the contents of the first message register.  
    seL4_SetMR(0,mr0); 
    //Make the call 
    tag = seL4_Call(0,tag);       
    //Get the contents of the first message register. This was 
    //transferred from the thread that replied to the call. 
    mr0 = seL4_GetMR(0);    
     
    printf("%s: Received message %d of length %d from endpoint %p.\n", 
      "test3", 
      mr0, 
      tag.length, 
      (void*)0x0000006d); 
 
  return 0; 
} 
